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I. INTRODUCTION
Is it possible for international law to regulate activities that, by defi-
nition, must take place covertly? This question has bedeviled domestic
constraints on intelligence gathering and is even more challenging to the
prospect of an international regime on intelligence activities. Interna-
tional law has traditionally had little to say directly about intelligence,
with state practice (for instance, widespread espionage, wiretapping, and
satellite reconnaissance) contradicting ostensible opinio juris (routine
denunciation of foreign intelligence activities). Various treaty regimes
touch on intelligence, but there is virtually no prospect of a treaty emerg-
ing that would define the contours of acceptable intelligence gathering,
because no state would agree to be bound by the limits on intelligence
gathering it would demand of its peers.'
This Article will consider generally the prospects for an approach to
intelligence activities based on the rule of law, focusing on the problem
of covertness. In particular, it will examine the debate over how law
should deal with crises, epitomized by the "ticking time-bomb" hypo-
thetical. On the one hand, some call for a pragmatic recognition that, in
extremis, public officials may be required to act outside the law and
* Global Professor and Director of the New York University School of Law Singapore
Program; Associate Professor of Law, National University of Singapore. I am grateful to R.
Rueban Balasubramaniam, David A. Jordan, and Victor V. Ramraj for their comments on ear-
lier drafts of this text. The Article is part of a larger research project on intelligence and
international law. See further SIMON CHESTERMAN, SHARED SECRETS: INTELLIGENCE AND
COLLECTIVE SECURITY (2006); Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came In from the Cold War:
Intelligence and International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1071 (2006). The present Article
draws closely on work first published as Deny Everything: Intelligence Activities and the Rule
of Law, in EMERGENCIES AND THE LIMITS OF LEGALITY (Victor V. Ramraj ed., forthcoming).
1. See generally Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came In from the Cold War: Intel-
ligence and International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1071 (2006).
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should seek after-the-fact ratification of their "extra-legal measures."2 On
the other hand, others argue that the embrace of "extra-legal measures"
misconceives the rule of law, underestimates the capacity of a constitu-
tional order to deal with crises, and overestimates the ability and
willingness of skittish publics to reign in officials. These two positions
have recently become identified with the works of Oren Gross and David
Dyzenhaus, respectively, although the debate is, of course, far older than
these agonists of post-September 11 constitutionalism. As Dyzenhaus
acknowledges, the question of whether the response of the executive in
emergencies is constrained by law was an argument that Victorian jurist
A.V. Dicey had with himself a century ago; Gross traces the essence of
his own argument back two centuries further to John Locke's theory of
prerogative power.'
What the two approaches have in common is that they presume a
measure of public deliberation on the appropriate response to crises.
Gross calls explicitly for a process of ex post facto ratification of extra-
legal measures; Dyzenhaus prefers to encourage experiments in institu-
tional design subject to the rule of law. The problem with both accounts
is that the various activities contemplated in this discussion-
assassination, torture, unregulated detention, surveillance unfettered by
civil liberties-are typically conducted on a covert basis. Covertness
may be deemed necessary for reasons of effectiveness, but also for po-
litical expediency: the damage to a state that admits that it tortures may
be more lasting than the harm torture is intended to avert.
The Article first visits the debate over exceptionalism as exemplified
by Gross's extra-legal measures model, focusing on the question of
whether ex post ratification could ever be a practical constraint on oth-
erwise unlawful behavior that is normally intended to be shielded from
public scrutiny. It then turns to the question of whether public delibera-
tion is a realistic prospect, drawing on three cases in which something
approaching Gross's extra-legal measures model has been adopted by the
United States: the use of aggressive interrogation techniques that push
the limits of torture, secret detention and extraordinary rendition of sus-
pects, and warrantless electronic surveillance. The fourth Part presents
an alternative lens through which to view assertions, whether publicly
2. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always be Con-
stitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003).
3. David Dyzenhaus, The State of Emergency in Legal Theory, in GLOBAL ANTI-
TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY 65 (Victor V. Ramraj, Michael Hor & Kent Roach eds., 2005).
4. Id. at 65-66. See also A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF
THE CONSTITUTION 412-24 (10th ed. 1959).
5. Gross, supra note 2, at 1102. See also JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERN-
MENT 166 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge University Press 1988) (1690).
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debated or not, that illegal conduct was justified: that such assertions
should be seen not as calls for ex post ratification of the conduct, but in-
stead as calls for using such justification as a mitigating factor in the
imposition of penalties. The Conclusion is broadly consistent with
Dyzenhaus' critique of Gross, but points to further challenges for the
rule of law, given the apparent incentives in extreme situations not
merely to circumvent the law but to remain silent about it.
II. RATIFICATION
Oren Gross's extra-legal measures model proposes to inform public
officials that
they may act extralegally when they believe that such action is
necessary for protecting the nation and the public in the face of
calamity, provided that they openly and publicly acknowledge
the nature of their actions. It is then up to the people to decide,
either directly or indirectly (e.g., through their elected represen-
tatives in the legislature), how to respond to such actions. The
people may decide to hold the actor to the wrongfulness of her
actions, demonstrating commitment to the violated principles
and values. The acting official may be called to answer, and
make legal and political reparations, for her actions. Alterna-
tively, the people may act to approve, ex post, the extralegal
actions of the public official.6
A central requirement of such an approach is candor: "To be imple-
mented properly, the model calls for candor on the part of government
agents, who must disclose the nature of their counter-emergency activi-
ties. 7
Indeed, candor is seen as one of the virtues of the model. Gross
refers in passing to the use of illegal interrogation techniques-notably
torture-by Israel's General Security Service (GSS) during the 1980s.
Gross uses the example of Israel's Landau Commission investigating
GSS interrogation methods to show the hypocrisy of legal systems that
are aware of a pattern of conduct but unwilling to acknowledge it
normatively. 8 Evidence of such hypocrisy supports Gross's position, and
the ambiguity embraced by the Landau Commission suggests that some
6. Gross, supra note 2, at 1023.
7. Id. at 1024.
8. Id. at 1045 (quoting ISRAELI GOV'T PRESS OFFICE, COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO
THE METHODS OF INVESTIGATION OF THE GENERAL SECURITY SERVICE REGARDING HOSTILE
TERRORIST ACTIVITY (1987), reprinted in 23 ISR. L. REV. 146 (1989)).
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societies are prepared to countenance extralegal activity. But it also
ignores the fact that the Israeli Supreme Court struck down the methods
of the GSS in 1999, specifically holding that detainees could not be
tortured.9 The President of the Court issued an unusual and eloquent
coda to the judgment:
This is the destiny of a democracy-it does not see all means as
acceptable, and the ways of its enemies are not always open be-
fore it. A democracy must sometimes fight with one hand tied
behind its back. Even so, a democracy has the upper hand. The
rule of law and the liberty of an individual constitute important
components in its understanding of security. At the end of the
day, they strengthen its spirit and this strength allows it to over-
come difficulties.'0
The Court left open the possibility that an individual official might nev-
ertheless claim a defense of necessity, but this would be a legal claim in
its own right, quite different from the argument that such an official
should be allowed or encouraged to act outside the law in the hope that
the law might be changed or the wrong ignored."
Gross might respond that this is precisely an example of his model
working, as the Court refused to provide the sort of de facto ratification
embraced by the Landau Commission. Yet the Court's decision also sug-
gests deep problems in the role Gross ascribes to ratification. The precise
manner of ratification is presented as an open list of possibilities, rang-
ing from bills of indemnity to reelection of a president who has run on a
policy justifying selective use of torture. 2 Such an open range of possi-
bilities, however, fails to present a coherent model in which conduct may
be seen as having been ratified. The most concrete example given is the
police officer who tortures a suspect in order to locate the ticking bomb,
an ideal-type hypothetical that has no precedent except in fiction (nota-
bly the "real-time" television series 24)" but nonetheless is repeatedly
invoked to justify more general use of torture. In the extra-legal meas-
ures model, the officer may be sacked, prosecuted, sued, or impeached,1
4
but for the model to be coherent, a formal choice not to pursue any of
9. HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 1, 23, avail-
able at http://elyonl.court.gov.illfiles-eng/94/000/051/aO9/94051000.aO9.pdf. Gross makes a
passing reference to the case but only to cite the difficult role of judges in a society like that of
Israel. Gross, supra note 2, at 1122 n.478.
10. Pub. Comm. Against Torture [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 1 at 37.
11. Necessity is discussed in Part IV, infra.
12. Gross, supra note 2, at 1099.
13. See Jane Mayer, Whatever It Takes: The Politics of the Man Behind "24", NEw
YORKER, Feb. 19, 2007, at 66.
14. Gross, supra note 2, at 1099.
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these punitive avenues should be ratified by "the people." The clearest
example of how this might happen is through legislation intended to
immunize "public officials from any potential civil or criminal liabil-
ity," though the extraordinary case of Little v. Barreme 6 (in which the
captain of a U.S. vessel was found guilty of violating a law prohibiting
transactions with French entities, lost an appeal to the Supreme Court,
but was reimbursed by Congress for his fines and expenses with inter-
est), is surely the exception that proves the rule. 7 More importantly,
Gross's switch from singular examples to plural-presumably necessary
in order to avoid the requirement for individualized legislation-
exemplifies the temptations inherent in the slippery slope down which
we have begun to descend.
Political ratification is no more coherent. The fact that more Ameri-
cans voted Republican in 2004 cannot sensibly be understood as
ratifying widely reported abuses of power, any more than the fact that
more voted Democrat in 2006 can be understood as evincing a change of
heart and desire for prosecutions. Much as a victorious political party is
wont to claim a mandate, it is inconceivable that an election would be
fought on issues defined clearly enough or won by a margin sufficient to
warrant the conclusion that otherwise illegal conduct has been ratified.
Gross addresses other possibilities such as prosecutorial discretion,
recalcitrant juries, and executive pardons in a couple of sentences." Of
these, prosecutorial discretion and executive pardons seem the most
likely forms of ratification, though both are exercised by an executive
branch that is most likely also to be the author of the impugned conduct.
Prosecutorial discretion in particular begs the question of what impact a
policy that may encourage vigilantism, on the basis that well-justified
acts will be exonerated, will have on more general police investigative
practices.
III. DELIBERATION
Whatever form of ratification is contemplated, a central claim of the
extra-legal measures model is that all of the measures can be acknowl-
edged openly.' 9 Indeed, Gross suggests that this open ratification,
activating a kind of public responsibility, is the main contribution of the
15. Id.
16. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
17. See Gross, supra note 2, at 1109-10.
18. Id. at 1115. See generally OREN GROSS & FONNUALA Nf AOLAIN, LAW IN TIMES OF
CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2006).
19. Gross, supra note 2, at 1099-1100.
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model to analogous discussions in Weber and Walzer.20 An act that would
normally be illegal
must be aimed at the advancement of the public good and must
be openly, candidly, and fully disclosed to the public. Once dis-
closed, it is a matter for the general public, either directly or
through its elected representatives, to ratify, ex post, those ac-
tions that have been taken on its behalf and in its name, or to
21denounce them.
Quite apart from the challenge posed to the rule of law by public of-
ficials "openly" and "candidly" violating the law, "[o]pen and candid
acknowledgment by the authorities of the need to resort to extralegal
measures" 22 would amount to an admission of guilt for the purposes of
any punitive proceedings, and it is therefore unlikely in the absence of
some preexisting guarantee that ex post ratification is more than a mere
possibility.
As Dyzenhaus observes, the model's assumption of an atmosphere
of fear among a population threatened by terrorism makes it highly
likely that an expectation of after-the-fact validation of illegal official
acts may arise, and that it would be met easily.23 In a limited number of
high-profile crises that may be true, but in operational terms it is more
likely that precisely the same logic that allows officials to violate exist-
ing laws will encourage them to keep those actions secret. Officials may
do this for pragmatic reasons of effectiveness; they may be reluctant to
discuss precise interrogation practices for fear of forewarning enemies
and frustrating the purpose of the methods, or to acknowledge surveil-
lance methods that might alert targets of investigation. A second set of
concerns encouraging secrecy involves the broader ramifications of a
government openly acknowledging that it violates norms that are not
merely domestic but international. Claims that interrogation had enabled
authorities to avert terror plots did not reduce the damage to the moral
standing of the United States caused by revelations of abuse at Abu
Ghraib, Guantdnamo Bay, and secret CIA detention facilities. Indeed,
periodic assertions that a new plot had been discovered-in at least some
cases years old and not beyond the planning stages-appeared to have
20. Id. at 1105 (referring, inter alia, to Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM
MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946),
and Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, in WAR AND MORAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY 62 (Marshall Cohen et al. eds., 1974)).
21. Id. at 1111-12.
22. Id. at 1127.
23. Dyzenhaus, supra note 3, at 72-73.
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24been invoked opportunistically precisely to deflect criticism. A third
reason to be hesitant about embracing public deliberation to limit extra-
legal adventures is that it is not typically elected officials who engage in
the relevant investigative or intelligence activities. Such actors-the po-
lice, intelligence operatives, special forces-are unlikely to be
responsive to the political pressures that the extra-legal measures model
would invoke as the primary check on their behavior.
This Part briefly discusses three areas in which the United States has
pushed the limits of domestic and international legality as part of an ef-
fort to respond to security threats. The three areas-torture, secret
detention and extraordinary rendition, and unlawful surveillance--do not
correspond directly to the three reasons for secrecy outlined above, but
they illustrate the manner in which such decisions are made and justi-
fied.
Vice President Dick Cheney articulated the general tenor of deci-
sions to be made by the executive branch five days after September 11,
2001, when he suggested a broad but undisclosed agenda for combating
future terrorist attacks in an interview on NBC's Meet the Press:
We also have to work, though, sort of the dark side, if you will.
We've got to spend time in the shadows in the intelligence
world. A lot of what needs to be done here will have to be done
quietly, without any discussion, using sources and methods that
are available to our intelligence agencies, if we're going to be
successful. That's the world these folks operate in, and so it's
going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal, basi-
cally, to achieve our objective.2
In the end, much of the administration's anti-terror agenda was de-
bated publicly, but this tended to be the result of investigative journalism
or disclosures in the course of legal action on behalf of affected indi-
viduals. There was little evidence of willingness on the part of the
administration to have arguments over legality "openly, candidly, and
24. For example, when defending the use of warrantless wiretaps within the United
States by the National Security Agency, the Bush Administration offered the example of
Iyman Faris-a truck driver with a fanciful plot to destroy the Brooklyn Bridge with a blow-
torch-as evidence of the value provided by the extralegal measures employed under the
controversial "Terrorist Surveillance Program." See Mark Hosenball & Evan Thomas, Hold
the Phone; Big Brother Knows Whom You Call: Is That Legal, and Will It Help Catch the Bad
Guys?, NEWSWEEK, May 22, 2006, at 22.
25. Interview with U.S. Vice President Cheney on Meet the Press (Sept. 16, 2001),
quoted in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GETTING AWAY WITH TORTURE? COMMAND RESPONSIBIL-
ITY FOR THE U.S. ABUSE OF DETAINEES 9 (2005), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/
us0405/us0405.pdf.
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fully disclosed. 26 On the contrary, questionable conduct was asserted, at
times improbably, to fall within the law. The most troubling conduct was
simply denied.
In the case of torture, for example, the Bush administration main-
tains the official position that it neither uses nor condones torture. Since
2001, however, it has authorized interrogation techniques widely re-
garded as torture, including by its own Department of State in annual
human rights reports on the practice of other countries. 27 The United
States is a party to the Convention against Torture, and torture is prohib-
ited under U.S. law whether or not it occurs within the jurisdiction of the
United States.2 ' Nevertheless, in an August 2002 memorandum, the De-
partment of Justice Office of Legal Counsel outlined the standards of
conduct permitted under the U.S. domestic law implementing the Con-
vention against Torture. Among other things, this memorandum adopted
an exceptionally narrow definition of torture, which it limited to physical
pain "equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical
injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even
death" or mental suffering that results in "significant psychological harm
of significant duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years."29 The
memorandum was one of a series of legal maneuvers adopted in the con-
text of the "war on terror" that included, among other things, attempts to
interpret the Geneva Conventions as having a extremely limited scope of
application .30
None of this analysis was intended to be made public. The growing
allegations of mistreatment by U.S. officials were harder to ignore fol-
26. Gross, supra note 2, at 1111.
27. Human Rights Watch, Descriptions of Techniques Allegedly Authorized by the CIA
(Nov. 21, 2005), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/11/2 1/usdom 12071 .htm.
28. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2004).
29. Memorandum from Jay C. Bybee, Department of Justice Office of the Legal
Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct
for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http:/
www.tomjoad.org/bybeememo.htm.
30. The Bush Administration refused to apply the Geneva Conventions to captured al
Qaeda or Taliban fighters during the U.S. war in Afghanistan. President Bush's military order
governing the detention of combatants during the conflict, Military Order of November 13,
2001-Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,
66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001), allowed the trial of Taliban or al Qaeda combatants by
military commissions, arguably in violation of the Geneva Conventions. Although the U.S.
Supreme Court eventually struck down this order in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749
(2006), it was largely reinstated by the U.S. Congress with the passage of the Military Com-
missions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered sections of
10 U.S.C. and at 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
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lowing a seminal Washington Post article in December 2002,"' but it was
only after photographic evidence of abuse leaked from the Abu Ghraib
prison in April 2004 that the issue came to be publicly debated. Even
then, most of the discussion was driven by the response to unauthorized
leaks of information, including the August 2002 Department of Justice
memorandum and other documents.
The Department of Defense repudiated the legal position of the Au-
gust 2002 memorandum on December 30, 2004, but no definition of
torture has been provided in its place.32 Among other contradictory sig-
nals, the Bush administration later opposed efforts led by Senator John
McCain to strengthen the legal prohibition of torture.33 A particular con-
troversy continues on the question of "waterboarding"-a technique
whereby interrogators bind a detainee to a board slanted at a decline,
place cellophane over his face, and pour water on his head, resulting in a
physiological response similar to drowning. In March 2005, then-CIA
Director Porter J. Goss called waterboarding a "professional interroga-
tion technique. 34 In October 2006, Vice President Cheney appeared to
agree with the use of waterboarding, specifically for Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed, concurring with the statement that a "dunk in water" for such
an individual is a "no-brainer" if it saves American lives.35 White House
Press Secretary Tony Snow later attempted to clarify that Cheney had not
been referring to waterboarding but merely to a literal "dunk in the water,"
31. Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, US Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations:
'Stress and Duress' Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities,
WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at AO1.
32. Although no specific definition has been provided for torture, the U.S. Defense
Department has responded to the detainee abuse scandals by issuing a revised and comprehen-
sive set of guidelines governing all military interrogations. On September 6, 2006, the U.S.
Army issued a new field manual on interrogations to replace the former Field Manual (FM)
34-52 which had been published in 1992. The new manual details the nineteen techniques that
may be used during the interrogation of detainees by U.S. military personnel. The list is ex-
haustive and the techniques listed represent the only methods that may ever be used. See U.S.
DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3: HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR OPERA-
TIONS (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-22.3.pdf. This manual,
however, does not apply to intelligence agencies outside of the military. The U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency, for example, is not bound by the manual, and its specific interrogation
methods remain unknown to the general public. See Christopher Graveline, The Unlearned
Lessons of Abu Ghraib, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2006, at A29.
33. See, e.g., Kate Zemike, Senate Approves Broad New Rules to Try Detainees, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2006, at Al.
34. Mark Mazzetti, CIA Worker Says Message on Torture Got Her Fired, N.Y. TIMES,
July 22, 2006, at Al 1.
35. Interview by Scott Hennen with Vice President Cheney, the White House, Washing-
ton, D.C. (Oct. 24, 2006), available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/2006
1024-7.html.
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prompting a reporter to ask, "so 'dunk in the water' means what, we
have a pool now at Guantdnamo, and they go swimming?
3 6
A similar dynamic was evident in revelations of and debate over the
U.S. practice of secret detention and extraordinary rendition. Following
occasional reports of secret detention centers, or "black sites," at Bagram
Air Force Base in Afghanistan 37 and Guantdnamo Bay's Camp Echo,38 it
was another Washington Post article in November 2005 that revealed the
scale of the program and growing debates within the CIA about its legal-
ity and morality. 39 At the request of senior officials, the Post did not
publish the name of the Eastern European countries-believed to be Po-
land and Romania-involved in the program, but stated that sites in the
program also included Afghanistan, Guantdinamo Bay, and Thailand. The
reason given for the overseas location of the black sites was that U.S.
domestic law prohibiting such secret detention would not apply there;
the CIA was operating on the authority of an order issued by President
Bush on September 17, 2001.0
Secrecy was also needed, however, in order not to raise legal ques-
tions in the foreign jurisdictions themselves. When published reports in
June 2003 revealed the existence of the site in Thailand, Thai officials
insisted that it be closed.4' The CIA abandoned plans to develop its facil-
ity in Guantinamo Bay when U.S. courts began to exercise greater
authority over military detainees in the main part of the facility.42 The
response from the CIA to the Post report was to request the Justice De-
partment to open a criminal investigation to determine the source of the
information.4'3 A senior intelligence officer, Mary 0. McCarthy, was later
fired from the CIA, apparently in connection with the earlier story."4
President Bush first acknowledged the use of secret prisons in Septem-
ber 2006, shortly before moving fourteen suspects from CIA detention to
36. Press Briefing, White House Press Secretary Tony Snow (Oct. 27, 2006), available
at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/l 0/20061027-1 .html.
37. Priest & Gellman, supra note 31.
38. David Rose, Revealed: The Full Story of the Guantdnamo Britons, OBSERVER, Mar.
14, 2004.
39. Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons: Debate Is Growing
Within Agency About Legality and Morality of Overseas System Set Up After 9/11, WASH.
POST, Nov. 2, 2005.
40. Id. Cf David Johnston, CIA Tells of Bush's Directive on the Handling of Detainees,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2006, at A14 (detailing the disclosure of classified documents signed by
President Bush related to CIA detention and interrogation of terror suspects).
41. Priest, supra note 39.
42. Id.
43. David Johnston & Carl Hulse, CIA Asks for Criminal Inquiry over Secret-Prison
Article, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 2005, at A18.




the military detention camp at Guantinamo Bay, which in theory ended
41the program.
The total number of detainees in black sites has been estimated at
about one hundred. An additional hundred are believed to have been in-
volved in the program of extraordinary rendition, the transfer of untried
persons to other countries for imprisonment and interrogation-in par-
ticular to countries with records of abuse and torture of detainees, such
as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. 6 An official di-
rectly involved in the process described it to the Washington Post in the
following way: "We don't kick the [expletive] out of them. We send
them to other countries so they can kick the [expletive] out of them.' 7
Authority for such forcible transfers is apparently outlined in a memo-
randum from March 13, 2002, entitled "The President's Power as
Commander in Chief to Transfer Captive Terrorists to the Control and
Custody of Foreign Nations. '48 The Bush administration has refused to
release or describe this memorandum, but it is referred to in the August
2002 memorandum on interrogation methods.49
Prominent examples of extraordinary rendition include the Syrian-
born Canadian citizen Maher Arar, who was detained in the United
States in September 2002 before being flown to Jordan and then Syria,
where he was interrogated and tortured by Syrian authorities. A year
later he was released without charge and returned to Canada, where a
public inquiry cleared him of any suspicion, sharply criticized the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police and other government departments, and led to
a formal protest over U.S. treatment of Arar.' °
Another relatively well-documented case concerns Hassan Mustafa
Osama Nasr, also known as Abu Omar, an Egyptian cleric apparently
abducted by the CIA from Milan in February 2003. He was taken to a
U.S. base in Aviano, Italy, and then flown to Egypt, where he was taken
into custody. In April 2004 he was released, and he telephoned his wife,
informing her among other things that he had been tortured with electric
45. Scott Shane, Detainees'Access to Lawyers Is Security Risk, CIA Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 5, 2006, at A29.
46. Priest & Gellman, supra note 31.
47. Id.
48. Bybee, supra note 29, at 38.
49. Id. See also Dana Priest & Dan Eggen, Terror Suspect Alleges Torture: Detainee
Says US Sent Him to Egypt Before Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2005, at A01.
50. See DENNIS O'CONNOR, COMM'N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN
OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER
ARAR (2006), available at www.ararcommission.ca. Among the criticisms of the Royal Cana-
dian Mounted Police were allegations that it had tried to silence a reporter covering the case
by raiding her home and office. See Ian Austen, Canada's Police Commissioner Resigns over
Deportation Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2006, at A7.
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shocks, had lost hearing in one ear, and could barely walk. Shortly after
this call he appears to have been rearrested by Egyptian authorities and
has not been heard from since.' In June 2005, an Italian judge issued a
warrant for the arrest of thirteen U.S. citizens said to be agents or opera-
tives of the CIA.52 Investigations by the New York Times indicated that, of
the thirteen names, eleven were probably aliases; public records showed
that some names received social security numbers less than ten years
earlier, and that some had addresses that were post office boxes in Vir-
ginia known to be used by the CIA.53 In April 2006, shortly after the
Italian general election, the outgoing Justice Minister announced that he
would not seek extradition of an expanded list of twenty-two CIA offi-
cers,5" but two high-ranking Italian intelligence officers were later
arrested for alleged complicity in the kidnapping 5
A third area where U.S. government activity not only pushed the
bounds of legality, but clearly went beyond established law, is in the area
of electronic surveillance. Interception of telephone calls by the National
Security Agency (NSA) between a party in the United States and a party
in a foreign country is governed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA), which allows for interception when a warrant is procured in
advance or, in some circumstances, within seventy-two hours of begin-
ning the intercept. A warrant may be issued if "there is probable cause to
believe that ... the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power."5 6 The law was passed in 1978 fol-
lowing intelligence scandals; in the following years, the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court-established under FISA to review re-
quests for surveillance warrants against suspected intelligence targets
inside the United States-rejected just five of almost 19,000 requests for
wiretaps and search warrants.57 Under the program in question even this
check on the NSA's activities was removed in cases where it was sus-
pected that one party to a phone conversation had links to a terrorist
organization such as al Qaeda. The presidential authorization that cre-
ated the program is classified and it appears that even congressional
51. Stephen Grey & Don van Natta, 13 with the CIA Sought by Italy in a Kidnapping,
N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2005, at Al.
52. Id.
53. Adam Liptak, Experts Doubt Accused CIA Operatives Will Stand Trial in Italy, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 2005, at A8.
54. Peter Kiefer, Italian Minister Declines to Seek Extradition of CIA Operatives, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2006, atA6.
55. Ian Fisher & Elisabetta Povoledo, Italy's Top Spy Is Expected to Be Indicted in
Abduction Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2006, at A3.
56. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3) (2000).
57. Carol D. Leonnig, Secret Court's Judges Were Warned About NSA Spy Data, WASH.
POST, Feb. 9, 2006, at AO1 (citing figures from 1979 to 2004).
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intelligence committees were only partially briefed on its scope, though
President Bush has said the authorization is renewed "approximately
every 45 days."58 Administration lawyers defended the program alter-
nately on the basis that congressional authorization was implied in the
Congressional Joint Authorization for the Use of Military Force of Sep-
tember 18, 2001, or that the president enjoys the inherent power to
authorize such activities in his constitutional role as Commander-in-
Chief. 9 These arguments have been largely rejected by legal academics,
and the program was declared unconstitutional by a district court judge,
though her decision has been stayed pending appeal to the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appealsi 0 A series of legislative proposals to deal with the con-
troversy are at various stages in Congress, ranging from a proposal to
grant retroactive amnesty for warrantless surveillance conducted under
presidential authority to reassertions of FISA as the exclusive means of
authorizing foreign surveillance.6'
Once again, however, open discussion of the program and remedies
for apparent violation of the law was involuntary. The New York Times
learned of the program in 2004 but was persuaded by the Bush admini-
62stration not to publish the story for more than a year. Only when the
story was published-in part, it seems, because the information was
shortly to be disclosed in a book by one of the journalists involved6 3-
did congressional leaders begin to challenge the legality of the program.
In a press conference, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales said that the
administration had "discussions with Congress in the past-certain
members of Congress-as to whether or not FISA could be amended to
allow us to adequately deal with this kind of threat, and we were advised
that that would be difficult, if not impossible."64 He later clarified that he
had intended to say that it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to
obtain legislation without compromising the program. For his part,
President Bush declared that leaks to the press concerning the program
58. George W. Bush, President's Radio Address (Dec. 17, 2005), available at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051217.html.
59. Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Legal Rationale by Justice Dept. on Spying Effort,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at Al.
60. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich.
2006).
61. Walter Pincus, Specter Offers Compromise on NSA Surveillance, WASH. POST, June
9, 2006, at A04.
62. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets US Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al.
63. See JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA AND THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2006).
64. Press Briefing, Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General, and General Michael Hayden,
Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005), available at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219- .html.
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were "a shameful act" that was "helping the enemy."65 He added that he
assumed a Justice Department investigation into the leak was moving
forward, though there appears to have been no effort on the part of inves-
tigators to contact the journalists involved. 66
In each of these cases-torture, extra-judicial detention, and war-
rantless surveillance-the relevant officials clearly never intended to
engage in public deliberation on the legality of the practice. The reasons
for embracing secrecy in counterterrorism operations may be well-
founded. In 1998, for example, the Washington Times reported that the
NSA was able to monitor Osama bin Laden's satellite phone.67 Soon after
the story was published, bin Laden ceased using the phone and largely
disappeared from the reach of U.S. intelligence. A CIA agent who ran
the bin Laden desk at the time has suggested that a direct causal link can
be drawn between publication of the article and the September 11 attacks
on the United States.6" Nevertheless, once embraced, a culture of tolerat-
ing secrecy in pushing the limits of law is difficult to contain. As the
Church Committee found in the 1970s during the inquiries that led to the
adoption of FISA, the doctrine of "plausible deniability" was developed
in order to avoid attribution of illegal conduct to the United States for• 69
covert operations. Evidence before the Committee, however, clearly
demonstrated that the concept, initially intended to protect the United
States and its operatives from the consequences of disclosures, soon ex-
panded to "mask decisions of the president and his senior staff
members.,
70
It appears unrealistic, therefore, to put much hope in the prospect
that decisions to take extra-legal measures will ever be made either
openly or candidly. This conclusion changes the calculus for responding
to conduct that may violate the law, and in particular suggests the need
for great caution in presuming that illegal conduct will be ratified. On
the contrary, it suggests the need to adopt a precautionary approach that
does not assume the good faith of interested officials serving as judges in
their own cause.
65. Press Conference of the President (Dec. 19, 2005), available at www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2005/12/20051219-2.html; Dan Eggen, White House Trains Efforts on Media
Leaks: Sources, Reporters Could Be Prosecuted, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2006, at A01.
66. Press Conference of the President, supra note 65.
67. Patrick Radden Keefe, Cat-and-Mouse Games, N.Y. REV. BooKs, May 26, 2005, at
41. See also Martin Sieff, Terrorist Driven by Hatred for US, Israel, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 21,
1998, at Al.
68. Keefe, supra note 67.
69. SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, COVERT ACTION AND A VEHICLE FOR FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMEN-





How, then, should a legal system deal with rare circumstances in
which violations of the law may be perceived as justified or even neces-
sary?
Necessity itself provides a partial remedy, though the examples dis-
cussed in this Article would not all fall within its relatively narrow
framework. To be successful, a necessity defense must typically demon-
strate that the harm sought to be avoided was greater than the harm
caused, that there was no reasonable alternative to the action taken, and
that the actor did not create the danger he or she sought to avoid. A key
question is whether the honest belief of the accused is sufficient to jus-
tify the defense: in Gross's hypothetical, it is highly likely that the
decision whether or not to ratify torture would depend on whether the
tortured person did in fact know where the ticking bomb was located, not
on whether the torturer believed it to be the case.
The American Law Institute adopted a belief-based "choice of evils"
approach to the question of necessity in its Model Penal Code:
Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm
or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that: (a)
the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater
than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense
charged; and (b) neither the Code nor other law defining the of-
fense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific
situation involved; and (c) a legislative purpose to exclude the
justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.7
The Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel cited this defini-
tion of necessity as "especially relevant in the current circumstances" in
the August 2002 memorandum that purported to authorize torture out-
side the United States. Assuming the existence of al Qaeda sleeper cells
plotting against the United States on a scale equal to or greater than the
September 11 attacks, the memorandum argued that "any harm that
might occur during an interrogation would pale to insignificance com-
pared to the harm avoided by preventing such an attack, which could
take hundreds or thousands of lives. 7 3 The memo claimed that two fac-
tors shape the contours of a necessity defense to torture: the degree of
71. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02.
72. Bybee, supra note 29, at 39-40.
73. Id. at 41.
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certainty that an individual has information needed to prevent an attack,
and the likelihood and scale of that attack.74
This opportunistic reading of the prohibition of torture-ignoring,
among other things, the explicit intention at international law that the
prohibition of torture be nonderogable-adopts a logic similar to that of
Gross: one constructs an ideal-type situation in which a reasonable per-
son would countenance torture, and then extends this reasoning to assert
that the prohibition on torture is inherently qualified.75 The flaw in this
approach is that the ticking time-bomb scenario is both highly seductive
and wildly implausible. Henry Shue's critique is dated but worth quoting
at length:
Much more important from the perspective of whether general
conclusions applicable to ordinary cases can be drawn are the
background conditions that tend to be assumed. The proposed
victim of our torture is not someone we suspect of planting the
device: he is the perpetrator. He is not some pitiful psychotic
making one last play for attention: he did plant the device. The
wiring is not backwards, the mechanism is not jammed: the de-
vice will destroy the city if not deactivated.
... The torture will not be conducted in the basement of a small-
town jail in the provinces by local thugs popping pills; the prime
minister and chief justice are being kept informed; and a priest
and doctor are present. The victim will not be raped or forced to
eat excrement and will not collapse with a heart attack or be-
come deranged before talking; while avoiding irreparable
damage, the antiseptic pain will carefully be increased only up
to the point at which the necessary information is divulged, and
the doctor will then immediately administer an antibiotic and a
•• 76
tranquilizer.
Even Shue concludes that if the precise facts of the ticking bomb
scenario were satisfied, it would not be possible to deny the permissibil-
74. Id. Departures from the Convention against Torture in the U.S. implementing legis-
lation were interpreted as supporting this view. Torture was not defined as the intentional
infliction of severe pain or suffering "for such purpose[] as obtaining from him or a third per-
son information or a confession"; by removing this purpose element, "Congress allowed the
necessity defense to apply when appropriate." In addition, the requirement in the Convention
against Torture that "no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a
threat of war, internal political instability or any other pubic emergency, may be invoked as a
justification of torture" was not incorporated in the text of Section 2340. Id. at 41 n.23.
75. Cf W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 67, 82-84 (2005).
76. Henry Shue, Torture, 7 PIL. & PUB. AVE. 124, 142 (1978).
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ity of torture." But the implausibility of the perfect scenario is precisely
why there is a rule against torture without the possibility of derogation.
For similar reasons, necessity as a defense in criminal law is circum-
scribed extremely narrowly. In the paradigmatic case of R v. Dudley and
Stephens, two men were shipwrecked at sea for almost three weeks be-
fore killing and eating their cabin boy. Even so, they were convicted and
sentenced to death:
It is not needful to point out the awful danger of admitting the
principle which has been contended for. Who is to be the judge
of this sort of necessity? By what measure is the comparative
value of lives to be measured? Is it to be strength, or intellect, or
what? It is plain that the principle leaves to him who is to profit
by it to determine the necessity which will justify him in delib-
erately taking another's life to save his own. In this case the
weakest, the youngest, the most unresisting, was chosen. Was it
more necessary to kill him than one of the grown men? The an-
swer must be "No"-
"So spake the Fiend, and with necessity,
The tyrant's plea, excused his devilish deeds."
It is not suggested that in this particular case the deeds were
"devilish," but it is quite plain that such a principle once admit-
ted might be made the legal cloak for unbridled passion and
atrocious crime. There is no safe path for judges to tread but to
ascertain the law to the best of their ability and to declare it ac-
cording to their judgment; and if in any case the law appears to
be too severe on individuals, to leave it to the Sovereign to exer-
cise that prerogative of mercy which the Constitution has
intrusted to the hands fittest to dispense it.7"
The sentence was later commuted to six months' imprisonment by
Queen Victoria.
Taking seriously the argument that certain forms of ex post ratifica-
tion may encourage (or at least not discourage) official acts necessary for
security while maintaining a degree of uncertainty appropriate to dis-
courage abuse, it is possible to distinguish at least four ways in which
ratification might operate. First, it might assert the absence of a wrong
through a general amnesty. Second, it could acknowledge a wrong but
absolve it, through some form of indemnification. Third, an act might
77. Id. at 141.
78. R v. Dudley & Stephens, (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273 (Eng.).
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attract formal legal sanction but with a minimal penalty imposed. Fourth,
through the exercise of discretion, no action might be taken to investi-
gate an alleged wrong. Of these, only the third approach would appear to
maintain the uncertainty that is at the heart of Gross's model, yet this is
more properly seen not as a call for ratification of an act but as mitiga-
tion in punishment for a wrong.
A better view, then, may be not to think in terms of ratifying the
wrong but mitigating the penalty. This is distinct from legal absolution-
if prosecuted, an individual would still have a conviction entered against
his or her name-but in extraordinary circumstances discretion may be
exercised at the imposition of penalties. Such an approach has the virtue
of reaffirming the legal norm and imposing at least nominal sanction,
while recognizing that further punishment may serve no social purpose.
An analogy may be made with the legal status of euthanasia. Though
legalized in a few jurisdictions, euthanasia is regarded generally as a
grave challenge to the legal system. Arguments in favor of patient auton-
omy and the reality of medical practice must be weighed against the
danger of eroding the bright-line rule that prohibits intentional killing.79
The ethical and religious response has been to qualify the intent compo-
nent of this prohibition, relying on somewhat artificial doctrines such as
double effect (an overdose of morphine is intended to relieve pain, rather
than to kill) and act-omission (withholding food or hydration that leads
to death is distinct from administering poison). 0 The legal response, in a
number of cases, has been to affirm the bright-line rule but impose no
penalty."
Obviously, as the demand for any such violation of an established
norm increases, so the need for legal regulation of the "exception" be-
comes more important. This seems to be occurring in the case of
euthanasia, as medical advances have increased the discretion of doctors
in making end-of-life decisions. In many jurisdictions, continued reli-
ance on the possibility of bringing a homicide charge is now seen as an
79. See, e.g., SELECT COMMITTEE ON MEDICAL ETHICS, REPORT, 1994, H.L. 21-1 of
1993-94, 260 (Walton Report) (U.K.).
80. See generally EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL, AND LEGAL PERSPEC-
TIVES (John Keown ed., 1995).
81. See, e.g., R v. Cox, (1992) 12 B.M.L.R. 38 (U.K.). Dr. Nigel Cox was unable to
control the pain of a patient suffering from rheumatoid arthritis who repeatedly begged him to
kill her. Making no attempt to conceal what he was doing, he gave her a lethal injection of
potassium chloride. A nurse reported the action and he was charged with attempted murder (by
this time the body had been cremated and there was no evidence that the injection was the
operative cause of death). He was convicted of attempted murder but given a one-year sus-
pended sentence; the General Medical Council reprimanded him but permitted him to remain
a practicing doctor. John Harris, Euthanasia and the Value of Life, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED:
ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 80, at 6, 7.
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inadequate legal response to the ethical challenges posed by euthanasia.
8 2
There appears to be no such groundswell of support for a change in the
law in relation to the various forms of criminal conduct contemplated in
this discussion.
International law also provides some support for an approach involv-
ing condemnation without significant punishment. In the Corfu Channel
case, Britain claimed that its intervention in Albanian territorial waters
was justified on the basis that no other states were prepared to deal with
the threat of mines planted in an international strait. The International
Court of Justice rejected this argument in unequivocal terms,83 but held
that a declaration of illegality was itself a sufficient remedy for the
wrong." Similarly, after Israel abducted Adolf Eichmann from Argentina
to face criminal charges, Argentina lodged a complaint with the Security
Council, which passed a resolution stating that the sovereignty of Argen-
tina had been infringed and requesting Israel to make "appropriate
reparation." 5 Nevertheless, "mindful" of the concern that Eichmann be
brought to justice, the Security Council's resolution on the matter clearly
implied that "appropriate reparation" would not involve his physical re-
turn to Argentina. 6  The governments of Israel and Argentina
subsequently issued a joint communiqu6 resolving to "view as settled the
incident which was caused in the wake of the action of citizens of Israel
which violated the basic rights of the State of Argentina. '7
It might be argued that the approach here is similar to ex post ratifi-
cation. Indeed, the exercise of discretion in the mitigation of penalty
might take place either in a judicial process, such as imposing a token
penalty, or as part of an executive pardon in the manner of Queen Victo-
ria's commutation of the cannibals' sentences. But by requiring a judicial
82. See Simon Chesterman, Last Rights: Euthanasia, the Sanctity of Life and the Law
in the Netherlands and the Northern Territory of Australia, 47 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 362
(1998), and sources there cited.
83. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9) (merits) ("The Court cannot
accept this line of defense. The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as a
policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to the most serious abuses and such as can-
not, whatever be the present defects in international organization, find a place in international
law.").
84. Id. at 36.
85. S.C. Res. 138, U.N. Doc S/4349 (June 23, 1960).
86. Id.
87. Joint Communiqu6 of the Governments of Israel and Argentina, Aug. 3, 1960, re-
printed in 36 I.L.R. 59. As the prohibition of the use of force is an obligation erga omnes,
however, a simple waiver by the target state-particularly a waiver by a regime put in power
by the intervening state, as in the case of the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989-would not
obviate the need to explain the action to the larger international community. See Simon Ches-
terman, Rethinking Panama: International Law and the US Invasion of Panama, 1989, in THE
REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IAN BROWNLIE 57 (Guy S. Good-
win-Gill & Stefan A. Talmon eds., 1999).
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process first to determine the existence of the wrong, mitigation reduces
the danger of an executive asserting for itself the right to approve con-
duct that is never scrutinized. The key difference is trust: as the cases
discussed in this Part show, there is little reason to trust the candor of an
executive to disclose openly alleged wrongs perpetrated in the name of
national security. In the absence of investigative journalists at newspa-
pers such as the New York Times and the Washington Post, few if any of
the questionable conduct discussed here would have been exposed to any
form of public scrutiny. This is not to suggest that a mitigation approach
would encourage any more candor-on the contrary, it assumes that po-
litical and legal incentives will always encourage secrecy. Nevertheless,
the possibility of prosecution and punishment will do more to improve
behavior than formalized endorsement of wrongdoing asserted to be in
the national interest.
V. CONCLUSION
As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., famously warned a century ago, hard
cases make bad law.8 Justice Holmes' observation seems especially apt
here. But the context from which the clich6 is typically lifted also bears
examination. As Holmes noted, the hard cases are frequently the great
ones:
Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are
called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping
the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate
overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts
the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hy-
draulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem
doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law
will bend. 9
How the current historical period will be viewed, what effects the
war on terror will have on norms that had until very recently been re-
garded as well settled, and what role lawyers and academics will play in
shaping those norms depends very much on the consequences of the hy-
draulic pressure currently at work on the international system.
"The Americans can always be counted on to do the right thing,"
Winston Churchill once observed, " .. . after they've exhausted all the
88. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197,400 (1904).
89. Id. at 400-01. Holmes, of course, was writing in dissent.
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alternatives." 9 There is, in the wake of the repudiation of the torture
memorandum, the renewed vigilance on the part of the judiciary,9' and
the falling of scales from the eyes of the American public, some reason
to hope that the clich6 will be borne out, and that the considered out-
come of public deliberation within the United States will be a
reaffirmation of the rule of law even in times of crisis.
90. Quoted in Michael Hirsh, Bloody Necessary, WASH. MONTHLY, Apr. 2005, at 43,
47.
91. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In
criticizing the government's detention of Hamdi without charge or trial, Scalia turned to the
Founding Fathers:
The Founders well understood the difficult tradeoff between safety and freedom.
"Safety from external danger," Hamilton declared,
is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of
liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction
of life and property incident to war; the continual effort and alarm atten-
dant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached
to liberty, to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a
tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they,
at length, become willing to run the risk of being less free.
The Federalist No. 8, p. 33. The Founders warned us about the risk, and equipped
us with a Constitution designed to deal with it. Many think it not only inevitable but
entirely proper that liberty give way to security in times of national crisis-that, at
the extremes of military exigency, inter arma silent leges. Whatever the general
merits of the view that war silences law or modulates its voice, that view has no
place in the interpretation and application of a Constitution designed precisely to
confront war and, in a manner that accords with democratic principles, to accom-
modate it.
Id. at 578-79.
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